We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized mechanism that runs in time polynomial in the size of the support. We leverage this result to show that in the oracle model introduced by Ronen and Saberi [FOCS'02], there exists a polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanism that provides a (1.5 + )-approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and a polynomial time deterministic truthful mechanism that guarantees 5 3 approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal deterministic truthful mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
Myerson, in his seminal paper [11] , studies the following problem: n bidders are competing on a single item , and each bidder's value for the item is drawn independently from a distribution. What is the optimal revenue-maximizing auction? Myerson gives a complete and simple characterization of the optimal auctions. A natural open question raised by this work is to analyze the case when the bidders' values are drawn from a general (correlated) distribution. That question is the topic of this paper.
Naturally, the problem has been heavily studied in economics. Usually, the economics approach involved attempts to characterize restricted special cases. See [7] for a survey. One notable exception was given by Cremer and McLean [6] , who show that sometimes an auction that extracts the full social welfare exists. However, the proposed solution works only for a restricted class of distributions. More severely, although each bidder's expected gain from participating in the mechanism is zero, it is common for a bidder to be charged an amount greatly exceeding her value. This is unrealistic in many settings. 1 Ronen [14] offers a thought-provoking alternative to the economics approach: instead of struggling to find an exact characterization of optimal auctions -even though a simple characterization probably does not exist in the case of correlated distributions -we should design auctions that are approximately optimal. Ronen presents the following elegant truthful mechanism, the lookahead auction, that provides in expectation at least half of the revenue of the optimal auction. First, find the n − 1 bidders with the lowest values.
Given their values, consider the conditional distribution of the value vi of bidder i with the highest valuation, and calculate a price p that maximizes the expected revenue. If vi ≥ p, bidder i is assigned the item and is charged p, otherwise no one is assigned the item and no one pays anything.
We continue the line of research of studying approximately optimal auctions. In particular, we investigate the following three research directions.
Research Direction I: Obtaining Better Approximation Ratios
Perhaps the first question every theoretical computer scientist would ask following Ronen's paper is: "Are there mechanisms with better approximation ratios?" To answer this question we have to be more explicit about the computational model in hand. Ronen and Saberi [15] introduce the oracle model: the distribution is given to us as a black box and we are allowed to ask conditional-distribution queries. That is, given the values of n − k players, what is the conditional distribution of the values of the remaining k players? Ronen and Saberi prove several hardness results in this model, in particular that no ascending auction can guarantee a 4 3 -approximation. The other model is the explicit model, where the running time has to be polynomial in the support size of the distribution. Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [13] prove that it is possible to exactly compute the optimal deterministic auction for 2 bidders, but NP-hard to do so for more bidders.
Research Direction II: Relaxing the Solution Concept
This paper considers three extensively studied notions of truthfulness. The simplest and strongest one is dominant strategy truthfulness (or deterministic truthfulness): a profitmaximizing strategy of each bidder is to reveal his true value. The second notion is randomized universal truthfulness: here a mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. The third notion is that of truthfulness in expectation: revealing the true value maximizes the expected profit of each bidder, where the expectation is taken over the internal random coins of the mechanism.
Myerson [11] shows that the optimal auction is always deterministic when bids are independent, even if truthfulness in expectation is allowed 2 . We pose the following question: can truthful-in-expectation mechanisms achieve more revenue than deterministic mechanisms when the distribution is correlated? If so, how much more? Notice that this question is of interest both as a pure existence question and when computational efficient is taken into consideration. Both issues were studied in [3] in a different setting.
Research Direction III: Beyond Single-Item Auctions
Naturally, we would like to design revenue-maximizing auctions also for more complicated settings. The direct characterization approach of economists was successful so far only in limited settings -for example, Armstrong [1] characterizes optimal auctions for two items and two bidders with additive valuations, where each bidder has only two possible values for each item and the valuations are independently distributed -while the approximation approach of computer scientists was mostly successful when either con- 2 In fact, he proves that this is true even under the weaker notion of Bayesian truthfulness (see [12] for a definition).
sidering the weak solution concept of Bayesian truthfulness [2] 3 or studying the revenue of certain restricted families of mechanisms [4] , both with independent valuations.
Our Results
Our paper contributes to all three directions sketched above while drawing connections between them. The starting point of our investigations is one, quite simple, observation: in the explicit model the optimal truthful-in-expectation auction can be computed in polynomial time. This auction can be found by solving a natural linear program 4 that encodes allocation probabilities, expected payments, and the incentive constraints that link them. Unlike the mechanism of Cremer and McLean [6] , ours never charges agents an amount greater than their bid value, a property shared by all of the mechanisms we construct in this paper.
Unfortunately, while the explicit model might be useful for settings with a small number of players, for large numbers of players the distribution usually has exponentially large support, e.g. when each player has two possible values and valuations are independent. We overcome this obstacle by reducing the optimal auction design problem for any number of players to the problem of designing optimal auctions for a constant number of players, for which the LP-based approach is feasible. Consider the following extension of the lookahead auction, termed the k-lookahead auction. Find the n − k bidders with the lowest values. Given their values, consider the conditional distribution of the values of the k bidders with the highest valuations, and run the optimal auction for these k bidders 5 . We show that this auction is a 3k−1 2k−1 -approximation to the optimal revenue 6 . In particular, this proves that there exists a polynomial time (1.5 + )-approximation truthful-in-expectation mechanism in the oracle model.
Next, we proceed to consider deterministic truthful mechanisms. We show the following general "derandomization" result: for every truthful-in-expectation mechanism for 2 bidders and a single item, there exists a universally truthful mechanism with the same allocation function and the same payments in expectation. In other words, relaxing the solution concept to truthfulness in expectation is useless, as every mechanism (in the above setting) can be implemented using the stronger notion of universal truthfulness.
This result has several implications. First: for two players, the optimal deterministic mechanism has the same revenue as the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and can be found in polynomial time. We achieve this by computing an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism A for two bidders using the LP approach, and then "derandomizing" it into a universally truthful algorithm A with the same ex-pected revenue. Now, since all (deterministic) mechanisms in the support of A must have the same expected revenue with respect to the distribution (otherwise A is not optimal), every one of them is an optimal revenue-maximizing deterministic mechanism. Prior to our work, a different polynomial-time algorithm for computing two-player optimal deterministic mechanisms, without the derandomization result, was obtained by Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [13] .
Another implication is that the 2-lookahead auction is in fact deterministic, even if truthfulness-in-expectation is allowed. Combining this with the approximation ratio of 2-lookahead auctions, we obtain the result that there exists a deterministic polynomial time truthful mechanism in the oracle model that guarantees 3 5 -fraction of the revenue of the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and, as a corollary, that for every truthful-in-expectation mechanism with an expected revenue of r, there exists a deterministic mechanism with expected revenue of at least 3 5 r. We stress that our derandomization result holds regardless of the objective function and even in the prior free setting. We complement this result by showing that if each player has only two possible values for the item ("low" and "high") then the mechanism can be implemented as a universally truthful mechanism, for any number of players. On the other hand, there is a 3-bidder 3-values truthful-in-expectation mechanism that cannot be implemented as a universally truthful algorithm. Together, this answers an open question of Mehta and Vazirani [10] .
Extensions Beyond Single-Item Auctions.
We show that our linear programming technique extends to yield optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, that are computationally efficient in the explicit model, for a number of settings beyond single-item auctions. First, we generalize to arbitrary single-parameter domains, showing that our linear program constitutes an efficient reduction from revenue maximization to social welfare maximization, in the explicit model when bidders have correlated types.
Next, we show that our technique also extends to certain multi-parameter domains: unit-demand valuations and additive valuations, again yielding computationally efficient optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanisms with correlated valuations in the explicit model. The key to these results lies in "decomposing" the fractional solution as a convex combination of integer solutions. For the additive case we present a direct decomposition, while for the unit demand case we use the classical Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem. We complement these positive results with a negative one: it is NP-hard to design optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for bidders with OXS valuations, in contrast to the social welfare maximization problem which is computationally easy for this class of valuations [8] .
Open Questions
While this paper studies several old questions, it also raises some new ones. Let us mention a few. In the single-item auction setting, what is the best approximation ratio that can be obtained in polynomial time by deterministic mechanisms? And by truthful-in-expectation mechanisms? We know the answer only for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms in the explicit model, and have gaps in all other cases. The key for a solution might be a better analysis of the klookahead auction. Our best lower bound on the approximation ratio of the k-lookahead auction is k+1 k
. Does the approximation ratio of the k-lookahead auction approach 1 as k grows? We suspect that it does not, but have been unable to prove it.
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Another question is to understand how well deterministic mechanisms perform compared to their truthful-in-expectation counterparts. We showed that the ratio is at most 5 3 . In the full version of the paper we present an example demonstrating that the ratio is at least 1.001. Quantifying the gap essentially boils down to the purely combinatorial problem of analyzing the integrality gap of our linear program.
We provided conditions in which truthful-in-expectation mechanisms can be implemented as universally truthful mechanisms. Can this be extended to other single-parameter settings, such as scheduling on related machines?
The multi-item setting also has plenty of questions to offer. We showed that for additive and unit demand valuations the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism can be efficiently computed in the explicit model, but that it is hard to do so for the more general OXS class. Can we design truthful mechanisms with a good approximation ratio for the OXS class, and for the richer gross substitutes class? The question is of interest also in the oracle model. Also, to what extent do truthful-in-expectation mechanisms outperform deterministic mechanisms in these settings, ignoring computational issues?
Finally, it would be very interesting to study other ways of specifying the type distribution in both the single and multi item settings. Specifically, in what cases can good approximations be obtained in polynomial time, if we are only given black-box access to samples from the distribution?
PRELIMINARIES

The Single-Item Setting
We have one item and n bidders, where bidder i has a privately known value vi ≥ 0. We assume some distribution D on the values of bidders. We allow the distribution of different bidders' values to be correlated. A mechanism M takes a bid vector v and returns an allocation and a price for each bidder. We use M (v) = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) to denote the allocation vector. In randomized mechanisms, we allow allocations to be fractions. For example, M (v)i = xi is the probability with which bidder i gets the item when the bid vector is v. Alternatively, we say bidder i gets a M (v)i fraction of the item. When the mechanism is deterministic, each xi has to be 0 or 1. We require that ∑ i xi ≤ 1 in any allocation vector. This condition is called the feasibility of M . In single-parameter domains, the feasibility condition is generalized by stipulating that M (v) must lie in a specified set of feasible vectors or, in the case of randomized mechanisms, the convex hull of the feasible vectors. When bidder i's bid is vi and he gets a fraction xi of the item, the expected payment he makes is required to be at most vixi. This is the individual rationality (IR) condition. Throughout this paper, our mechanisms have the additional property that with any outcome of the random coins, the payment made by the bidder who gets the item is at most his bid. Our goal is to maximize the total expected payment (the revenue) of the bidders, where expectation is taken over D.
The valuations of all bidders but bidder
Here xi, pi (resp. x i , p i ) denote the allocation and expected payment when bidder i declares a value of vi (resp. v i ). Note that when xi and x i can be fractions, the two sides of the inequality are the expected profits of bidder i if he bids vi and v i , respectively. Therefore the mechanism can be called truthful in expectation: truthful for bidders that maximize their expected profits. A mechanism is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. Notice that the distribution D is not involved in our definitions of truthfulness, i.e., our mechanisms are truthful for all possible values, not just values in the support of D. In particular, observe that bidders do not need to have any knowledge of D, or any other common prior.
For a distribution D and a mechanism M , let
≤ α, where OPT is the revenuemaximizing truthful mechanism given D. (OPT might be truthful or truthful in expectation, depending on the setting.)
To determine the running time of the mechanism, we use two different models. In the explicit model we get an explicit list of every type in the support of D and its probability. The auction should run in time polynomial in n and the support size of D. In the oracle model, introduced by Ronen and Saberi [15] , the distribution is represented by an oracle that can answer the following type of queries 8 : Pr[a1 = v1, . . . , an = vn], which may include conditional distribution queries. In this model the running time should be polynomial in n and in the combined support size of the players' marginal distributions (i.e., the quantity Σi #{vi | ∃v−i such that (vi, v−i) ∈ support(D)}). We assume that the support of each marginal distribution is known to the mechanism in advance.
Multi-Item Settings
In the last part of the paper we discuss multi-item issues. Here we have m items and n bidders, where bidder i has a valuation function vi that gives a non-negative value for each bundle S of items. We will consider several restrictions on the valuation functions, but we define them in the relevant sections. The definitions from the single item case extend naturally: each bidder i is assigned a bundle Si (or, in the randomized case, a distribution over bundles) and charged pi, where pi = 0 in case Si is the empty bundle. We assume a distribution. As before, we want to maximize the expected revenue.
A mechanism is truthful if each bidder maximizes his profit by revealing his true valuation, and is truthful-inexpectation if revealing his true valuation maximizes his expected profit. The definition of approximation ratio extends naturally. In this paper, for multi-item settings we are interested only in the explicit model, where the support of the distribution is explicitly enumerated. The running time of mechanisms should be polynomial in m, n, and the size of the support.
AN OPTIMAL TRUTHFUL IN EXPEC-TATION MECHANISM
In this section we show that the optimal truthful in expectation mechanism can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the distribution D (the explicit model). We leverage this result later when in Section 5 we analyze the approximation ratio of the k-lookahead auction. To make the k-lookahead auction computationally efficient, the construction of this section is involved as a subroutine. As a consequence of Section 4 we have that the optimal truthfulin-expectation mechanism for two bidders is deterministic. Finally, in Section 6 we extend this construction to several more complicated domains.
The result of this section is based on writing a natural linear program for the problem. We have to be careful when interpreting the linear program as a truthful mechanism, as the mechanism has to be defined over all possible bid vectors, not just those in the support of D. Towards this end, we will need some notation and definitions. Let Di = {vi | v ∈ D}. We assume that for every i, 0 ∈ Di. This is without loss of generality since we may assume that PrD
• Solve the following linear program:
Maximize:
• Let v = v1, . . . , vn be the (realized) valuations of the bidders. The allocation and payments are determined according to the following cases:
1. If v ∈ D, then allocate the item to exactly one bidder, where each bidder i receives the item with probability x i, v . Let the payment of the winning bidder i be
. The other bidders pay 0.
If v / ∈ D, every bidder i for which v−i / ∈ D−i is not allocated the item and does not pay anything. For each bidder i for which v−i ∈ D−i,
Each such bidder i receives the item with probability x i,(v i , v −i ) and pays
contingent upon receiving the item. The proof consists of the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.2. The algorithm is feasible, individually rational and truthful in expectation.
Proof. To see that the algorithm is feasible, consider the following cases:
• v ∈ D: feasibility from the LP constraints.
• v / ∈ T : bidder i may receive the item only if v−i ∈ D−i. By definition of T this can happen only if vi /
∈ Di, which implies that for every other bidder j, v−j / ∈ D−j, thus only bidder i may receive the item.
• v ∈ T (and v / ∈ D): again, bidder i may receive the item only if v−i ∈ D−i. In that case v i = vi, because the second set of constraints in the LP guarantees that the argmax in the definition of v i is actually equal to vi. Now, feasibility is again guaranteed by the first set of constraints.
To see that the algorithm is individually rational, assume that bidder i wins the item and that his payment is
. By the constraints of the LP we have that
as needed. We now show that the algorithm is truthful in expectation.
Consider bidder i. If v−i /
∈ D−i, bidder i never receives the item regardless of his value vi. Hence assume that v−i ∈ Di. Bidder i wins the item with probability x i, v and his payment in this case is
. Thus the expected profit of bidder i when he declares his true value is x i, v ·vi −p i, v . We now show that the profit of i is not bigger when he declares any other value v i . We assume that v ∈ T : otherwise by the definition of the algorithm, bidder i is facing several alternatives whose prices do not depend on i's value, and he is to take the most profitable one; in this case truthfulness is obvious.
When (v i , v−i) ∈ T . As before, the profit of bidder i is
. By the constraints of the LP we have that (w, v −i ) which is at most, by the constraints of the LP, his profit from declaring his true value vi (i.e.,
The following lemma is straightforward, since the size of the LP is polynomial in the size of T , which is polynomial in the size of D: Proof. Given that the valuation profile is v ∈ D, the expected payment from each bidder i is
Thus the expected revenue of the algorithm (where the expectation is taken over D) is exactly the optimal value of the linear program:
∑ i p v . We now prove the second statement. Consider the revenue maximizing, individually rational, truthful in expectation mechanism for D. Set the variables of the linear program: for each v ∈ T , set x i, v be the probability that i receives the item given that the valuation profile is v, and let p i, v be his expected payment in case the valuation profile is v. Notice that the linear program is feasible (the item is allocated to only one bidder so ∑ i x i, v ≤ 1) and that the expected revenue equals the objective function of the linear program.
DETERMINISTIC VS. TRUTHFUL IN EXPECTATION MECHANISMS
In this section, we show that for every two-bidder truthfulin-expectation mechanism M , there exists a universally truthful mechanism M with "the same" behavior. In other words, for two-bidder single item auctions, relaxing the solution concept from universal truthfulness to truthfulness in expectation is useless: every allocation function that is implementable by a truthful-in-expectation mechanism is also implementable by a universally truthful mechanism. Notice that if M implements M , then the two mechanisms have the same expected revenue. We show that for two bidders, for every truthful-in-expectation mechanism M , there is a universally truthful mechanism that implements it. We would also like to show that this can be done efficiently. We assume that M is represented by an oracle: The proof, presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, is constructive, and it presents an algorithm that takes a truthful-inexpectation mechanism M as input and outputs a universally truthful mechanism M that implements M . The algorithm is efficient as long as the alternative oracle can be efficiently implemented. In particular we get that:
There is an algorithm that finds a 2-bidder optimal deterministic truthful mechanism for singleitem auctions in time polynomial in the size of the support of the distribution.
Proof. In the previous section we showed that an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism M can be found in time polynomial in the size of the support of the distribution. Since alternative oracle queries can be answered in time polynomial in the size of the support of the mechanism, Theorem 4.3 guarantees that we can find a universally truthful mechanism M that implements M in polynomial time. Finally, M is a distribution over deterministic mechanisms that achieves an optimal revenue (in expectation). Thus, every mechanism in the support of M obtains that revenue, in particular the one that sets all the random coins to, say, 0.
This amounts to a re-derivation of a result in [13] . However, we would like to stress that the applicability of our result is not limited to revenue maximization. For 
.7. Every truthful-in-expectation mechanism for n bidders where each bidder has only two possible values can be implemented as a universally truthful mechanism. However, there exists a truthful-in-expectation mechanism for three bidders where each bidder has three possible values that cannot be implemented as a universally truthful mechanism.
Back to designing optimal auctions, we also show an explicit distribution with small support size, for which the best truthful-in-expectation mechanism performs better than the best deterministic mechanism. This distribution builds upon the construction in the proof of the second half of Theorem 4.7. 
The Algorithm
For the rest of the discussion in this subsection we fix a truthful in expectation mechanism M . In this presentation of the algorithm we assume R i v contains finitely many elements. We extend it in Section 4.2 to a procedure for constructing a universally truthful mechanism that implements M, even when the sets R 
A truthful-in-expectation mechanism M implements a Bayesian truthful mechanism M (when the distribution is D) if, for every each bidder i and vi ∈ Di, the probability with which bidder i gets the item when he bids vi in M is exactly the same as that in M , i.e.,
Note that by individual rationality, p i 0 must be 0. The main idea of the algorithm is to set a take-it-or-leaveit offer to each bidder where the price of the offer is obtained by randomly "simulating" Myerson's payment formula [11] . The novelty of the proof is in showing that these offers can be coordinated in the following sense: when one bidder accepts the offer, the other one will reject it. We present the algorithm as follows. We note that it is obvious the algorithm runs in time polynomial in maxi,v |R i v |.
1. Sample r ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random. 
Elicit a bid from each bidder. Let the bids be (v1, v2).
For each bidder i, i ∈ {1, 2}: (a) Consider
R i v −i = {(x i k , p i k ) | x i k < x i k+1 , ∀k}. La- bel points in each interval (x i k , x
Correctness of the Algorithm
The proof consists of the following claims. 
Rearranging the inequalities, we get:
The claim follows by inductively applying the claim for each two consecutive intervals.
Claim 4.10. The mechanism M the algorithm produces is universally truthful.
Proof. Observe that after choosing r, M elicits bids, and then makes an allocation decision and a take-it-or-leaveit offer for each bidder, where the price for bidder i does not depend on bidder i's valuation but only on v−i and r (by Claim 4.9 if bidder i is assigned the item then vi − p ≥ 0, otherwise vi − p ≤ 0). Notice that when a bidder has a zero profit from taking the item we can break ties arbitrarily without affecting truthfulness. Hence, for each r the algorithm is truthful. Since we choose r in a way that is independent of the bids, M is a universally truthful mechanism.
The next two claims show that indeed M implements M and that M never allocates more than one item.
Claim 4.11. M implements M.
Proof. Suppose that bidder i with value vi is assigned x and his payment is
In the algorithm, it is easy to see that the probability that bidder i is assigned the item is exactly x. The expected payment of bidder i is:
Proof. Given valuations (v1, v2), suppose that M assigns fractions x and y to the two bidders, respectively, then by the feasibility of M , x + y ≤ 1. Therefore, bidder 2 is assigned the item exactly when 1 − r ≤ y, i.e., r ≥ 1 − y ≥ x, which is the condition that bidder 1 is not assigned the item. This guarantees the feasibility of M .
We have proved the correctness of the algorithm in Section 4.1. Now we extend it to a procedure for the case when R i v −i 's can be infinite. Similarly to the algorithm presented in Section 4.1, the mechanism first chooses a number r ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random. For every value of r, we have a deterministic mechanism as follows:
1. Elicit a bid from each bidder. Let the bids be (v1, v2). (v1, v2) 1, allocate the item to bidder 1; if 1 − r < M (v1, v2)2, allocate the item to bidder 2.
If r ≤ M
3. By the characterization of individually rational truthful mechanisms in this setting, the payment of the bidder who gets the item is determined by the monotone allocation rule specified in the last step -if bidder 1 gets the item, he makes the payment inf{v1 | M (v1, v2)1 > r}; if bidder 2 gets the item, he makes the payment inf{v2
By similar arguments as in the previous claims, for every value of r this deterministic mechanism is truthful and feasible. We therefore obtain a distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms, i.e., a universally truthful mechanism. This mechanism implements the allocation rule of M , and by the uniqueness of payment scheme for individually rational truthful mechanisms, the payment of M is implemented as well.
We note that the algorithm presented in Section 4.1 for the finite case is a special case of the procedure presented above. We presented it in an apparently different way simply to make the algorithm more explicit and to make it clear that its running time is polynomially bounded in that case.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3. We further remark that for a truthful-in-expectation mechanism M that is not IR and p i 0 is not 0, we can still find a universally truthful mechanism that implements it. We simply change the labels to be
, and the rest of the argument (except Claim 4.9 in its exact form) goes through.
THE APPROXIMATION RATIO OF THE K-LOOKAHEAD AUCTION
In this section we analyze the k-lookahead auction which is defined as follows. Find the k bidders with the highest values, and denote this set of bidders by K. Run the revenue-maximizing truthful auction for K conditioned on the values of bidders in N \K. Notice that the auction for K can either be the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism or the optimal deterministic mechanism. . In particular, for k = 2 the approximation ratio is at least 5 3 , and the approximation ratio tends to 3 2 as k tends to ∞.
We remark that if the auction for K is allowed to be truthful-in-expectation, then the approximation ratio is with respect to the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism 10 . Taking into account the result of Section 3 we get that: In particular this implies a bounded ratio between the revenue of the optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism and that of the optimal deterministic mechanism for n-bidder single-item auctions in general: 
Analysis of the k-Lookahead Auction
Denote the original distribution by D, and denote the conditional distribution of the values of the bidders in K given the values of bidders in N \ K by DK . We let v k+1 denote the the value of the (k + 1) th -highest bidder. We show that one of the following three families of auctions provides a good approximation ratio. The k-lookahead auction obviously provides at least as much expected revenue, and the theorem follows. The auctions are defined for k ≥ 2. The second and third auctions depend on a parameter t ≥ 1, to be specified later.
1. k-Highest Auction: Run the optimal auction. If one of the bidders in N \ K is assigned the item in the optimal auction, no bidder is assigned the item and no one is charged anything. If one of the bidders in K is assigned the item in the revenue-maximizing auction then assign him the item and charge him as in the revenue-maximizing auction, or v k+1 , whichever is larger.
t-Fixed
Price Auction: Select one bidder ("the reserve bidder") from K uniformly at random, denote this bidder by i. If any of the bidders in K \ {i} has value above t · v k+1 then he receives the item and pays t · v k+1 . If there are several such bidders, break ties arbitrarily. Otherwise, the reserve bidder gets the item and pays v k+1 .
t-Pivot
Auction: Select one bidder ("the pivot") from K uniformly at random, and denote this bidder by i. If any of the bidders of in K \ {i} has value above t · v k+1 then run the revenue maximizing auction for bidders in K, conditioned on the values of bidders in N \ K. Otherwise the pivot bidder gets the item and pays v k+1 .
It is straightforward to see that the k-Highest Auction and the t-Fixed Price Auction are truthful and individually rational 11 . To see that the t-Pivot Auction is truthful we observe that this auction is monotone: the only non-straightforward case to check is when bidder i raises his value and forces the mechanism to run the optimal auction. However, in this case bidder i was not allocated the item before raising his value, so monotonicity is preserved.
Proof. (of Theorem 5.1) Let l be the event where no bidder in K has value at least t · v k+1 , and let l be the complement of this event. We partition the expected revenue of the optimal auction:
• let L l be the expected revenue from bidders in N \ K from instances where event l occurs.
• Let M be the expected revenue from bidders in K from instances where event l occurs.
• Let H be the expected revenue from bidders in K from instances where event l occurs.
Observe that the expected revenue of the optimal auction is L l + L l + H + M . We continue by proving several lemmas. Proof. By definition the auction extracts exactly the same revenue as the optimal auction from bidders in K and no revenue from bidders in N \ K. The lemma follows.
Lemma 5.6. The expected revenue of the t-Fixed Price Auction is at least
11 If the optimal auctions used by the k-Highest Auction and the t-Pivot Auction are deterministic or universally truthful, then all three auctions are universally truthful, as is their convex combination. In this case our proof shows that there is a deterministic auction on the k highest bidders that achieves a
) -approximation to the deterministic optimal auction.
Proof. First, notice that the revenue of the t-Fixed Price Auction in every instance is at least v k+1 (either the reserve bidder is allocated the item and pays v k+1 or the auction sells the item at a higher price). Suppose that event l occurs. This case contributes L l + M to the expected revenue of the optimal auction. Observe that, if l occurs, in any instance where the optimal auction sells the item to bidders in N \K, its revenue is at most v k+1 (the price for a sold item is at most the value of the bidder), and that in any instance the optimal auction sells the item to bidders in N \K the revenue is at most t · v k+1 . Thus, the instances where event l occurs contribute L l + M t to the expected revenue of the t-Fixed Price Auction.
Suppose now that event l occurs. Thus, there exists some bidder b with v b > t · v k+1 . With probability exactly
is not the reserve bidder and in this case the revenue of the auction is t · v k+1 . With probability 1 k we have that b is the reserve bidder and the revenue of the auction is at least v k+1 . In particular, for every instance where the optimal auction sells the item to bidders in N \ K (at a price of at most v k+1 ) the t-Fixed Price Auction has an expected revenue of at least
Together with the contribution from instances where event l occurs we have that the expected revenue of the auction is at least
Lemma
The expected revenue of the t-Pivot Auction, conditioned on the values of bidders in
Proof. Suppose that event l occurs , b is not the reserve bidder and in this case the revenue of the auction is at least H. With probability 1 k we have that b is the reserve bidder and the revenue of the auction is at least 1 k · v k+1 . Again, similarly to the analysis of the t-Fixed Price Auction the expected contribution to the revenue when the event l occurs is
Next we need some definitions. Conditioned on the values of bidders in N \ K, let OPT be the revenue of the revenue-maximizing auction, R h be the revenue of the kHighest Auction, R f be the expected revenue of the t-Fixed Price Auction, Rp the expected revenue of the t-Pivot Auction and R = max(R f , Rp). In addition, for the rest of the proof we fix t =
Proof. We divide the analysis into two cases. Suppose first that L l · t ≥ H, which implies that
by our choice of t. We have that:
The other case that we still have to handle is when it holds that L l · t < H.
We are now finally able to analyze the ratio between the expected ratio of the revenue-maximizing auction and the k-lookahead auction. We consider two cases and show that in each one the expected ratio is at most 2 −
). We have that, using Lemma 5.8:
EXTENSIONS OF OUR TECHNIQUES
In this section, we extend our techniques presented in Section 3 to more general settings.
Single Parameter Domains
In this section, we show that in some single-dimensional settings the problem of designing revenue maximizing truthfulin-expectation mechanisms can be reduced to finding an outcome that maximizes the social welfare. For any randomized mechanism, given a bidding vector v, it will output outcome ω with probability xv,ω, and charge bidder i an expected price pi,v.
By a similar argument as that in Section 3, we can solve the optimal mechanism design problem if we could solve the following linear program:
If we can optimally solve the LP, we can run a mechanism that outputs ω * at a bid vector v with probability xv,ω * , and charges bidder i a payment of pi,v ·
.
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Since Ω can be exponentially large, the LP above may involve exponentially many variables, but it has only polynomially many constraints. Writing out its dual, we get
If there is a separation oracle, we can solve the dual. Since there are only polynomially many constraints in the second group, it suffices to give a separation oracle for the first group of constraints. But there are only polynomially many v ∈ D, and the problem boils down to the following: given any v ∈ D and γv, is there an ω ∈ Ω such that ∑ i αi,ω
This problem can be solved by an oracle that, given a bid vector, outputs an outcome that maximizes the social welfare -feed the oracle with a bidding vector where bidder i's type is ∑
, and the left hand side becomes the social welfare of outcome ω. If the ω that the oracle returns has social welfare at most γv, then no constraint for this v is violated, otherwise we find a violated constraint. This completes the proof.
Multi-Parameter Domains
In this section we extend our technique of Section 3 to several multi-parameter settings and obtain optimal auctions in these settings. We set up a general framework that relates a linear program to revenue maximizing mechanism design, then explore specific settings with this perspective.
A truthful-in-expectation mechanism M can be described by the following parameters: at a bid vector v, M allocates to bidder i a fraction xi,S,v of each bundle S ⊆ M , and charges him an expected price pi,v. We want M to be feasible, individually rational and truthful-in-expectation, and maximize the revenue. We use the following LP:
Maximize:
∑ v∈D PrD(v) · pi,v, s.t.
-∀i, v ∈ Ti, S ⊆ M : Proof of the observation is essentially the same as that of Theorem 3.1. The problem of designing optimal mechanism, however, cannot be directly reduced to solving the LP. First, the number of both variables and constraints can be exponential in m. Second, even if we can solve the LP optimally, not all solutions can be decomposed by mechanisms. An easy counterexample is when m = n = 3, where each bidder i single-mindedly demands the bundle M \{i}, having a valuation of 1 for it. Let v be the only bid vector in this case, then the solution where x i,M \{i},v = for all i is an optimal solution to the LP, but it is obvious that no mechanism can decompose this solution.
In the full version of the paper, we show that in the settings of additive valuations and unit-demand valuations, both the issues can be above can be solved. In both settings, the bidders' types and allocation distributions can be described succintly in terms of m. For additive valuations, the LP solutions is readily decomposed, and the revenue is kept by the linearity of expectations. For unit-demand valuations, the LP solutions can be efficiently decomposed by using the classical Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem. We thus have the following: In constrast, in the domain of OXS valuations [8] , for which the social welfare maximization problem is known to be solvable in polynomial time, we have the following hardness result, which indicates that the result in Section 6.1 does not generalize to multi-parameter domains.
Theorem 6.7. It is NP-hard to design an optimal truthfulin-expectation mechanism for OXS bidders, even when there is a single bidder with a simple type distribution.
